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UEFA v The European Community: Attempts of the
Governing Body of European Soccer to Circumvent
EU Freedom of Movement and Antidiscrimination
Labor Law
Lindsey Valaine Briggs*

I. BACKGROUND: EUROPEAN SOCCER AND EUROPEAN UNION

FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS LAW
The United European Football Association ("UEFA') is the governing
body responsible for regulating soccer throughout Europe. UEFA, working
closely with the globally-oriented F~d6ration Internationale de Football
Association ("FIFA"),1 promulgates rules and regulations regarding all aspects of
the play of soccer within Europe.2 Regulation under both FIFA and UEFA
extends to rules of play, rules of player transfer, rules of contract and arbitration,
and rules of player eligibility. UEFA has authority to regulate competition on
both the European national and club team levels. National teams represent
European countries in international competition, whereas club teams compete
within one country's private league in a manner similar to competition in the
NFL or the NBA. The best club teams from each country's private league also
compete against one another in the UEFA Cup and UEFA Champions League.
These interleague competitions showcase the best private teams in European
soccer and do not take place under color of any national flag.3
The propriety of selecting players based on nationality when composing a
national team is not an area of dispute-it is at the private, club team level that
nationality selection issues arise. In Donti v Mantero, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities ("ECJ") recognized that international sports
BA 2000, Vassar College; JD Candidate 2006, The University of Chicago.
1

See generally <http://www.fifa.com/en/index.htm> (visited Jan 20, 2005).

2

See generally <htp://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/overview/index.hmi;>

3

See generally <http://www.uefa.com/Competitions/UefaCup/index.html> (visited Feb 20,
2005); <http://www.uefa.com/Competitions/UCL/index.htm> (visited Feb 20, 2005).

(visited Jan 20, 2005).
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competition, in which countries are represented by their national teams, does
not fall within the category of economic activity regulated by the Treaty
Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty").4 Because EU
antidiscrimination labor law under the EC Treaty applies only to economic
activity, nonnationals can be excluded from national teams without violating EU
free movement regulations.5 Freedom of movement under the EC Treaty
"entail[s] the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the Member States as regards employment" by prohibiting barriers
on free movement of EU workers between EU nations. 6 The free movement
regulations were enacted for economic reasons-"to free up the labour market
as 'human capital' or factors of
with migrant workers who were regarded
' 7
production within the common market.
Because club sports within nations qualify as economic in nature, free
movement and antidiscrimination requirements apply to club team player
selection.8 Prior to 1991, UEFA mandated that club teams could only have two
noncitizens on their starting lineup (not including assimilated foreigners). 9 In
1991, as a result of negotiations between UEFA and the European Commission,
this rule was relaxed. UEFA implemented new quotas for club teams: three
players on each team's starting lineup had to be citizens of the country in which
the club was located and two could be foreigners that had lived in the country

4

5

Dond v Mantero, Case 13/76, 1976 ECR 1333,
14 (1976); Treaty Establishing the European
Community, 1997 OJ (C 340) 3 (Nov 10, 1997) (hereinafter EC Treaty).
EC Treaty, art 39 (cited in note 4). Article 39 does not prevent the adoption of "rules or
practice[s] exclud[ing] foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are
not of an economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and
are thus of sporting interest only," such as, for example, matches between national teams from
different countries. Dond, 1976 ECR at 19 (cited in note 4). Although international competitions
have become increasingly economic in nature, and although this must have been clear at the time
of the Dond decision, the ECJ probably felt that because the purpose of international competition is
noneconomic and the nature of international competition requires team membership to be
predicated on nationality, these types of competitions should be classified as noneconomic in
nature. The noneconomic classification probably also serves as a proxy for recognition that
national interests may, at times, override free movement of workers concerns. A nation's interest
inparticipating in international competition such as the Olympics and World Cup may override
free movement concerns. Thus, the exemption of national teams from freedom of movement
requirements is probably both a reflection of the primarily noneconomic purpose of the activity
and the level of national interest involved.

6

EC Treaty, art 39 (cited in note 4).

7

Jeff Kenner, EU Emplqyment Law: From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond 12 (Hart 2003).

8

Union Royale Belge des Soditis de FootballAssodationASBL v Bosman, Case 415/93, 1995 ECR 1-4921
(1995).

9

Rachel B. Arnedt, Comment, European Union Law and FootballNationaiy Restrictions: The Economics
and Politicsof the Bosman Decision, 12 Emory Intl L Rev 1091, 1104 (1998).
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for a certain number of years. This policy became known as the "3+2 Rule."1 ° In
Union Royale Beige des Socidiis de FootballAssociation ASBL v Bosman, however, the
ECJ held these nationality quotas to be in violation of the EC freedom of
movement requirement." UEFA reluctantly complied with the ECJ opinion and
revoked its nationality quotas.' 2
Because there is no longer a nationality quota, and because premier club
teams have their pick of the best players in Europe, many national club teams
are now composed primarily of foreign players. 3 In England, for example, two
of the most popular club teams (Arsenal and Chelsea) typically start each game
with only two or three English players out of eleven.' 4 UEFA leaders believe
that the low number of domestic players has a negative impact on both fan
morale and the development of high-quality national players.'" UEFA has
therefore proposed a new rule ("Homegrown Rule") under which club teams
will be required to employ a specific number of players (the current proposal is
four) that have been trained within the club's development program, as well as a
specific number (again four) who have been trained by any club within the
national league.' 6 Due to the young start age for these programs, this rule is likely
to result in a larger number of club team players being of the nationality of the
country in which their team is located.
UEFA has already passed the Homegrown Rule with respect to UEFA
Cup and Champions League games. For purposes of these interleague
competitions, UEFA will require all participating teams to adhere to the
Homegrown Rule by 2008.17 Many national clubs are currently engaged in debate

10

Id; David McArdle, From Boot Monfy to Bosman: Football,Sodety and the Law 37-38 (Cavendish 2000).

11

Bosman, 1995 ECR 1-4921.

12

McArdle, From Boot Money to Bosman at 46-47 (cited in note 10).

13

Denis Campbell, Maximum Club Squads of 25 in New Uefa Plans,Observer (UK) 8 (July 4, 2004).
See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/footbaIJ/teams/c/chelsea/squadprofiles/default.stm>
and <http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport /hi/football/teams/a/arsenal/squadprofiles/default.stm>
(visited Jan 20, 2004).

14

15

16

17

UEFA Chief Too Many Foreigners, Guardian (UK) (une 30, 2004), available online at
(visited Jan 20, 2005);
<http://football.guardian.co.uk/News-Story/,,1250891,00.html>
Campbell, Maximum Club Squads, Observer at 8 (cited in note 13).
online
at
available
11,
2004),
Your
Own
(Nov
Hart,
Grow
Simon
20,
(visited
Jan
<http://www.uefa.com/footballcentral/news/Knd=4/newsld=256575.html>
2005) (referring to earlier drafts of the Homegrown Rule); UEFA Out to Tdim Foreign Imports (Dec
16, 2004), available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/sportl/hi/footbaU/4100743.stm> (visited
Jan 10, 2005) (summarizing the most recent version of the Homegrown Rule).
at
online
3,
2005),
available
(Feb
Sets
Foreign
Player Limits
UEFA
(visited Feb 25,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/sport2/hi/football/europe/4233353.stm>
2005) ("[C]lubs competing in the Champions League and Uefa Cup will have to include four
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with UEFA regarding application of the Homegrown Rule to intraleague
competition. At present, because UEFA has not yet voted on whether to
officially adopt the Homegrown Rule with respect to intraleague competition,
the national leagues are being asked to adopt the Homegrown Rule voluntarily.
This approach has met resistance from heads of at least one of the most
important leagues in Europe, the English Premier League, casting doubt on
UEFA's ability to impose the rule in cooperation with the national leagues.' 8
UEFA will vote in April 2006 on whether to require national leagues to adopt
the Homegrown Rule. If they do, and leagues such as the English Premier
League still refuse to comply, UEFA will impose sanctions that reduce squad
size by the number of missing homegrown players.' 9
Part II of this paper reviews the Bosman holding in detail. Part III discusses
UEFA's response to the Bosman decision. In Part IV, I apply the Bosman
arguments and rationale to the Homegrown Rule. For the reasons discussed
below, the Homegrown Rule is in danger of being found to be an invalid
attempt to discriminate based on nationality in violation of Article 39 of the EC
Treaty. This conclusion is supported both by the ECJ opinion in Bosman and by
the EC's rejection of other proposed post-Bosman nationality policies. Finally, in
Part V, I conclude with my opinion as to whether the Homegrown Rule should
be invalidated, considering the unique nature of the "economic activity" of
soccer. I suggest that the EC should reconsider its unwavering application of EU
labor laws to the sport of soccer.
II. THE BOSMAN RULING
Union Royale Beige des Socijtis de FootballAssociation ASBL v Bosman involved2
both an attack on the 3+2 Rule and UEFA's interleague transfer fee system.
Both UEFA rules were challenged as violations of the EC Treaty free movement
of workers and antidiscrimination provisions 21 (and relevant regulations enacted
thereunder2 ). The challenges focused on the 3+2 quota as express
discrimination based on nationality, and the transfer requirement as an
homegrown players in their 25-man squad from 2006.... Uefa then wants six homegrown players
by 2007 and eight in 2008.').

18

UEFA Threat Over Foreign Quotas (Feb 16, 2005),
available
online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/sportl/hi/football/4270267.stm> (visited Feb 25, 2005).

19

Id.
Bosman, 1995 ECR 1-4921.
EC Treaty, art 39 (cited in note 4).

20

21

22

See, for example, Commission Regulation 1612/68, art 4(1), 1968 OJ (L 257) 475 ("Provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action of the Member States which restrict by
number or percentage the employment of foreign nationals in any undertaking, branch of activity
or region, or at a national level, shall not apply to nationals of the other Member States.").

Vol 6 No. 1

UEFA v The European Community

Briggs

obstruction tending to prevent workers from moving freely among Member
States.
A. THE 3+2 RULE
The Belgium Football Association and UEFA (joined as a defendant)
argued that the 3+2 Rule was a valid exception to the antidiscrimination laws
because it was "justified by 'sporting' reasons., 23 The "sporting" reasons
inherent in international competition had been used to create an exception to
antidiscrimination rules for national teams in Don v Mantero.24 Although such
international matches were, in some respects, economic in nature, the ECJ in
Dond stated that exclusion of foreign players from national teams was acceptable
if exclusion was "for reasons which are not of an economic nature, which relate
to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting
interest only.",2 1 In the context of competition between nations, the national
identity of a soccer team is manifested primarily through the nationality of its
players. If a match between England and Spain consisted of mostly French and
Brazilian players, there would be little substance behind the international
competition-the national identity of the teams would be in name only.
In Bosman, the football associations argued first that because the 3+2 Rule
governed only the number of nationals playing, not the number employed, it did
not violate the EC Treaty. 26 The ECJ, following the opinion of Advocate
General Lenz, 2 7 rejected this justification for the nationality quota.2' A team will
not hire players that it cannot reasonably expect to use in a match, and therefore
hiring of foreign players would be limited by a team's ability to use them
effectively. As stated by Advocate General Lenz: "Every club which plans and
acts in a reasonable manner will take the rules on foreign players into account in
its personnel policy. No such club will therefore engage more.., foreign players
than it may play in a match. 29

23

Roger Blanplain and Rita Inston, The Bosman Case: The End of the Transfer System? 19 (Sweet &

24

Maxwell 1996).
Dond, 1976 ECR at

25

Id.

26

Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, 1995 ECR at

27

Advocate General opinions offer guidance, but are not binding on the ECJ. Nevertheless, the
ECJ often follows the opinion of the Advocate General. When it does so, that opinion can be
evidence of the reasoning behind the ECJ decision and may be treated as persuasive authority.
This is particularly true when the court directly adopts or refers to the Advocate General opinion

28

Bosman, 1995 ECR at

29

Lenz Opinion, Bosman, 1995 ECR at

(as did the

Summer 2005

19.

.......
Cuu )

130-37.
136.

136.

ChicagoJournalof InternafionalLaw

The football associations then argued that even if the EC Treaty provision
was violated by the 3+2 Rule, the breach could be lawfully excused because the
exclusions were noneconomic and related to sporting interests only. The
associations argued specifically that nationality quotas (1) were important for
maintaining local fan loyalty; (2) resulted in a larger number of talented local
players within each country, thus contributing to the quality of each country's
national team and tending to increase the overall level of international
competition; and (3) provided some level of equalization among club teamsthe richest teams could not simply hire the strongest players in the world but
had to maintain a certain number °of local (less talented) players, thus avoiding,
3
to some extent, imbalance in play.
Advocate General Lenz rejected each of the asserted sporting benefits
furthered by the 3+2 Rule as either unsupported by evidence or achievable
through other means.3" With respect to the issue of fan loyalty, the Advocate
General stated: "[S]upporters are much more interested in the success of their
club than in the composition of the team.... [Furthermore] it is not uncommon
for those [foreign] players to attract the admiration and affection of football fans
....
,32 Fans tend to adopt good players as their own, regardless of origin.
In response to the argument that nationality quotas contribute to the
development of young players and further the quality of international play, the
Advocate General noted that most players develop in amateur leagues without
nationality restrictions-for example, English amateur leagues could field as
many German players as they liked-yet the extremely talented English national
team had developed largely through this unrestricted system. Furthermore, from
an economic perspective, interest in club teams often correlates with the success
of the national team of the country in which the clubs are located. The World
Cup in particular is well known for its enormous popularity, and the traditionally
victorious World Cup countries (such as Spain, Italy, and Germany) also tend to
have renowned and very popular private leagues. Thus, club teams will benefit
by encouraging the development of "national" players.33
Finally, with respect to imbalance between clubs, the Advocate General
noted that the richest club teams are still able to buy the best players available,
whether foreign or domestic, within applicable rule limitations, and that
therefore the 3+2 rule does little to solve the problem of imbalance.

30

Bosman, 1995 ECR at

33
32

Lenz Opinion, Bosman, 1995 ECR at
Id at 143.

33

Id at

123-25.
142-48.

145-46.
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Additionally, there are alternative 3 4(and likely superior) methods for mitigating
this imbalance, such as salary caps.
In sum, the Advocate General found no overriding sporting interests that
would justify an exception to the free movement of workers and
antidiscrimination rules for club soccer, an essentially economic activity. Club
team soccer does not implicate any national interest that could override free
movement and antidiscrimination safeguards under Article 39.3' But even if it
did, the Advocate General reasoned that the fundamental principles of "right to
freedom of movement and the prohibition of discrimination against nationals of
other Member States" outweighed any national interest in the identity of club
team players.3 6 By limiting the number of noncitizens who could play in any
given match, the 3+2 Rule placed noncitizen players at an employment
disadvantage relative to citizens. This discrimination based on nationality was an
unacceptable violation of Article 39 of the EC Treaty.
B. THE TRANSFER FEE SYSTEM
Prior to the decision in Bosman, UEFA imposed transfer fees for interclub
transfers of players. If, for instance, Arsenal's contract with a player expired and
Arsenal chose not to renew the contract, any team to whom that player
transferred would be required to pay Arsenal a substantial fee. If Arsenal didn't
believe that the other team could or would pay, it had the ability to prevent its
player from joining that team by refusing to sign the transfer agreement." This
system was attacked as an unacceptable obstacle to the free movement of
workers among EU Member States.
The Belgian Football Association argued that (1) the transfer system was
essential to the sport of soccer because it ensured a balance of playing ability
among clubs;38 and (2) the transfer fee system was unrelated to employment of

34

See id at

35

Id at
141-42. Article 39 states in relevant part: "[F]reedom of movement shall entail the
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment." EC Treaty,
art 39 (cited in note 4).
Lenz Opinion, Bosman, 1995 ECR at 142.

36
37
38

147.

Blanplain and Inston, The Bosman Case at 10-12 (cited in note 23).
218. The Advocate General summarized the Belgian
Lenz Opinion, Bosman, 1995 ECR at
Football Association's argument as follows:

[R]ules on transfers are necessary in order to preserve a certain financial and sporting balance
b cwt nluA
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of football as such. If no transfer fees were payable when players moved, the wealthy
clubs would easily secure themselves the best players, while the smaller clubs and
amateur clubs would get into financial difficulties and possibly even have to cease their
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players as such. Rather, it related only to relationships between clubs.3 9 For this
reason, there was no violation of the EU free movement of workers lawworkers could seek employment as they pleased subject to the terms of their
employment contracts. Decisions not to employ players, if directly resulting
4
0
from the transfer system, depended only on the status of respective employers.
Advocate General Lenz acknowledged that in certain circumstances,
concerns regarding the overall balance of team quality across the sport of soccer
as a whole could override freedom of movement restrictions. 4' However, the
transfier rules in place at the time of the Bosman decision did not qualify as valid
exceptions because they were not the only possible method for achieving
balance between clubs, and because they did not actually achieve such a
balance. 42 A system of pure income sharing among teams would better achieve
the result urged as a justification of the transfer fee system without implicating
the freedom of movement rules.4 3 The ECJ adopted the opinions of the
Advocate General in its ruling."
As a general rule of law regarding freedom of movement under the EC
Treaty, the ECJ stated:
[N]ationals of Member States have ... the right, which they derive directly
from the [EC] Treaty, to leave their country of origin to enter the territory
of another Member State and reside there in order there to pursue an
economic activity . . . Provisions which preclude or deter a national of a
Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his
right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that
freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the worker
45
concerned.
The transfer rules at issue in Bosman applied regardless of whether a
transfer occurred between clubs in the same country or between clubs from

activities. There would thus be a danger of the rich clubs always becoming even richer
and the less well-off even poorer.

Id.
39

Blanplain and Inston, The Bosman Case at 17 (cited in note 23).

40

Id at 22.
Lenz Opinion, Bosman, 1995 ECR at 9 219 ("Football is of great importance in the Community,
It would thus be possible, in
both from an economic and from a sentimental point of view ....
my opinion, to regard even the maintenance of a viable professional league as a reason in the
general interest which might justify restrictions on freedom of movement.... [A] professional
league can flourish only if there is no too glaring imbalance between the clubs taking part.").

41

42

Id at

43

224-25.

Id at

44

Bosman, 1995 ECR at

45

Id at 9 95-96.

226.
105-14.
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different national leagues.46 Any affect on EU citizens, therefore, was not
predicated on their nationality or even on the national identity of the club
involved. It was also true that the transfer fees did not apply directly to player
employment-no specific requirements were placed on players. Nonetheless, the
fee system did interfere with freedom of movement of players by limiting access
to employment.4" If no other team was willing to pay the transfer fee, a player
might be left unemployed or be forced to renew his previous contract. The
system could thus "restrict the freedom of movement of players who wish to
pursue their activity in another Member State."4 8
In sum, the Bosman decision recognized that, with the exception of
international play between national teams, EU antidiscrimination and freedom
of movement laws apply to the sport of soccer. Nationality quotas are
unacceptable discrimination, tending to reduce the number of jobs available to
nonnationals and thus restricting freedom of movement within the meaning of
Article 39 of the EC Treaty.4 9 Transfer fees, although not a restriction based on
nationality, nonetheless affect the freedom of movement of workers between
member states by placing a significant obstacle in the way of such movement
and preventing access to employment.
III. UEFA RESPONSE TO BOSMAN, PAST AND PRESENT
A. PAST ATTEMPTS TO AVOID THE BOSMAN RULING
UEFA firmly believes that it is good for the sport of soccer to limit the
number of nonnationals on any given club team. ° Clubs and nations then have
to expend resources to develop local players, which increases the overall quality
of international competition.' Furthermore, local fans feel a greater connection
to their teams if at least some of the players share their nationality.5 2 For this
reason, UEFA initially responded to the Bosman ruling by ignoring it. UEFA
46

Id at

47

Lenz Opinion, Bosman, 1995 ECR at 210 ("[A] player can transfer abroad only if the new club
(or the player himself) is in a position to pay the transfer fee demanded. If that is not the case, the
player cannot move abroad. That is a direct restriction on access to the employment market"
(emphasis added)).
Bosman, 1995 ECR at 99.

48

49
50

51

52

98.

See EC Treaty, art 39 (cited in note 4).
UEFA Chief: Too Many Foreigners (cited in note 15); Blatter Critical of Europe's Trade in Humans,'
at
online
available
2004),
15,
(Nov
SI.com
Illustrated:
Sports
<http://sportsiUustrated.cnn.com/2004/soccer/11/15/blatter/> (visited Jan 10, 2005).
Lars-Christer Olsson, Acting Now to Protect Football's Future (Nov 19, 2004), available online at
<http://www.uefa.com/uefa/news/Knd=128/newsld=259048.html> (visited Jan 20, 2005).
Hart, Grow Your Own (cited in note 16).
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refused, for almost a year after the ruling, to repeal its 3+2 quotas, arguing that
the quota had been based on a "gentlemen's agreement" between UEFA and the
EC and that the European Commission would never enforce the ruling.5 3 After
the Commission responded with the threat of legal sanctions and large fines if
the quota was not revoked, UEFA reluctantly complied. 4 UEFA has been trying
to get around EU antidiscrimination law ever since, and the Homegrown Rule,
which imposes quotas based on specific training program participation rather
than citizenship, is its most recent attempt.
Prior to the current scheme, UEFA first proposed a rule in 2000 ("2000
Proposal") that was rejected by EU officials as blatantly in violation of the
Bosman ruling. UEFA's argument in support of the 2000 Proposal is of particular
relevance to discussion of the Homegrown Rule. The 2000 Proposal would have
required that six players on each club team be eligible to play on the national
team for the country in which the club was located.55 At first glance, this rule
seems to be obvious discrimination based on nationality. UEFA, in fact,
conceded that the rule was discriminatory and urged, instead, that in spite of the
2000 Proposal's discriminatory effect, the EU give the sport of soccer special
treatment under EU employment law (an argument rejected by EU officials). 6
The most interesting aspect of the 2000 Proposal is the approach UEFA
chose not to take in support of its proposal. UEFA could have argued that
because eligibility to play on national teams need not always be predicated on
citizenship---for instance, noncitizens may be eligible to play on a country's
national team if one of their grandparents was a citizen of that country-the rule
was not discriminatory.57 Of course, the majority of players eligible for a

53

McArdle, From Boot Money to Bosman at 46-47 (cited in note 10).

54

Id.

55

Id at 55; EU Plans Curb on Foreign Footballers (Mar 17, 2000), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sport/football/681476.stm> (visited Jan 10, 2005); see also FITA
(Sep
15,
2004),
available
online
at
President's Media Roundtable in
London
(visited Jan
<http://www.fifa.com/en/news/feature/0,1451,103161,00.html?articleid=103161>
10, 2005).
EU Plans Curb on ForeignFootballers(cited in note 55).

56
57

The grandparent exception is frequently cited by soccer experts or on general soccer information
be
found
at
One
example
can
websites
and
forums.
<http://experts.about.com/q/1848/2436726.htm> (visited Jan 20, 2005). This exception may
result from the fact that FIFA standards for national team eligibility require only that players be
naturalized citizens of the country whose national team they play on. See FIFA Statutes, art 15
online
at
<http://www.fifa.com/fifa/statutes/statutesdocs/
(Aug
2004),
available
FIFAstatutes082004_E.pdf> (visited Jan 20, 2005). Naturalized citizenship requirements are
determined by each country. Thus the Republic of Ireland, which will grant citizenship to players
of recent Irish descent, may seek Americans with Irish parents for the Irish national team. See
Aidan Fitzmaurice, Have You Got Any Irisb in You? (Mar 12, 2004), available online at
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country's national team will not qualify under this minor exception and will only
be eligible through normal citizenship criteria. By imposing a quota under which
six players on any club had to be eligible for membership on the national team,
UEFA knew that it would be increasing domestic player levels on club teams.5 8
This intent-to limit foreign players and increase the number of domestic
players-is exactly why UEFA could not argue that the rule was
nondiscriminatory. EU officials would have concluded that a rule with (expressly
admitted) overall discriminatory effect cannot be saved by the fact that in a few
cases its application would be nondiscriminatory and unrelated to nationality. As
UEFA willingly acknowledged, the 2000 Proposal was a violation of the
principles laid down in Bosman.59
Because UEFA failed to win special treatment for soccer under EU
employment laws,60 any newly proposed quota must be nondiscriminatory and
must not impede the free movement of workers. The Homegrown Rule differs
from the 2000 Proposal only. in degree. The discriminatory effect of the
Homegrown Rule will be significantly less than that of the 2000 Proposal, but its
intent is the same: to sidestep Article 39 of the EC Treaty and the Bosman
ruling. With respect to the 2000 Proposal, UEFA did not even consider arguing
that a rule it expressly intended to be discriminatory was actually
nondiscriminatory because it did not discriminate in all instances. The argument
was clearly too weak to support the 2000 Proposal, yet there is no clear
alternative argument in favor of the Homegrown Rule, which will also have the
discriminatory effect of limiting foreign players and increasing domestic players
on club teams.
B. THE HOMEGROWN RULE
The Homegrown Rule will require that a certain number of players on any
team (probably four) be trained in the club's development program and that a
certain number (probably four) be trained in the development program of any
team within the national league.6" The rule will also limit the total number of
players a team can have on its roster (twenty-five), thus increasing the likelihood
that homegrown players will actually play and creating an incentive for quality

61

(visited Nov
<http://www.uefa.com/magazine/news/Kind=128/newsld=148898.html>
29, 2004).
EU Plans Curb on ForeignFootballers (cited in note 55); FIFA President'sMedia Roundtable in London
(cited in note 55).
EU Plans Curb on ForeignFootballers(cited in note 55).
McArdle. From Boot Mon- to Rosman at 55 (cit-4 i note 10).
UEFA Chief Too Many Foreigners(cited in note 15).

62

UEFA Out to Trim Foreign Imports (cited in note 16).

58

59

60
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development programs. 6 3 To meet the development requirement, players must
have been registered for a minimum of three seasons with a club, or within the
national league, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one.64 Soccer players
have historically tended to begin their careers in their home countries, so the rule
will at least serve to exclude many foreign players already over the age of twentyone (or under twenty-one but with too few years left to meet the three-year
requirement).
In addition, the relatively young age by which the development
requirement must be satisfied, and the three-year length of stay, will continue to
exclude new players. Although many clubs will pay for foreign youths to attend
their academies, it is still difficult and impractical for many teens to attend.
Considerations other than soccer, such as schooling and family, will discourage
young players from training in foreign countries. While young EU players might
be willing to spend three years training in England, Spain, or Italy, there is little
incentive for them to go abroad to less prestigious leagues. Furthermore, the
Homegrown Rule will force national leagues to create quality development
programs, which may partially eliminate the need for talented youths to move to
foreign countries. This effect has been positively characterized as a way to avoid
disruption in the lives of teens.6" Avoiding disruption for young players is
secondary, of course, to UEFA's stated purpose for the Homegrown Rule of
reducing the number of foreign players on club teams.
IV. DOES THE HOMEGROWN RULE SATISFY FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENTS
AFTER BOSMAN?
The Homegrown Rule is clearly an attempt to circumvent EU
antidiscrimination law. Although the rule does not explicitly impose nationality
requirements on club teams, the effect of the requirement will be to decrease the
number of foreign youths being trained by each club development program and
thereby increase the number of local players on any given team.66 The two
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holdings in Bosman-that discrimination based on nationality will not be allowed
in soccer, and that obstructions to the free movement of workers within
Member States are prohibited 6 7 -could each lead to a successful challenge of the
proposed rule if it is passed.
A. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON NATIONALITY
The intended effect of the Homegrown Rule is to increase the number of
local players on any given club team without expressly requiring selection of
players based on nationality.68 UEFA can thus create de facto nationality quotas
without ever using the word "nationality," and UEFA will argue in support of
the Homegrown Rule that it is largely nondiscriminatory in its application. This
argument focuses on the degree of de facto discrimination. UEFA will rely on the
uncertainty and discretion involved in determining whether a disparate impact is
actually impermissible discrimination, and argue essentially as follows: the
Homegrown development requirements are much easier to comply with than
national team eligibility requirements under the 2000 Proposal, and foreign
players have more control over whether they will meet the development
requirements. Thus, although the general tendency of the Homegrown Rule will
be to select based on nationality, it will not do so to the same extent as the 2000
Proposal, nor will it do so expressly. The Homegrown Rule, because it is less
egregious than the 2000 Proposal, should be upheld.
The 2000 Proposal failed under the Bosman principle because although in a
few instances the rule would be nondiscriminatory, its overall application would
result in reduced hiring of foreign players. 69 Here, too, the Homegrown Rule will
not always discriminate-children and teens from France are welcome to move
to England or Spain for training in the Manchester United or Real Madrid
development programs. Nonetheless, UEFA's argument for validity of the
Homegrown Proposal is weak because most of the young players in any club
training program will still be from the country in which the club is located. This
is especially true when high-quality development programs become available to
young players in their home countries, which will be one secondary effect of the
Homegrown Rule. The overall effect of the rule will be discriminatory.

countries will also retain more domestic youths (because there is no incentive to go elsewhere).
Because development programs do not have unlimited space, there may thus still be a greater
proportion of homegrown domestic players in countries with prestigious leagues.
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A second argument-that soccer should be excused from employment law
requirements-has been effectively foreclosed by precedent. Discriminatory
effect cannot be excused based on "sporting" interests because the ECJ has
already rejected both the importance of developing national talent and the
encouragement of local loyalty to club teams as possible valid reasons to
override antidiscrimination principles. 70 EU officials rejected UEFA's renewed
attempts to win a general exception for sports under EU employment law when
it invalidated the 2000 Proposal. 7' Neither the special status of sports generally
nor the peculiar needs of soccer are likely to be accepted by the EU as valid
justifications for a rule tending to allow de facto discrimination based on
nationality.
B. OBSTRUCTION OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
The EC Treaty and the Bosman ruling also prohibit obstacles to the free
movement of workers among the EU Member States: "Provisions which
preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of
origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute
an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality
of the workers concerned."7 2 This prohibition differs from the express
prohibition on discrimination discussed above because it focuses on indirect
discriminatory effects. Provisions that will have the effect of limiting the ability of
an EU citizen to move freely among other Members States, even though they do
not expressly regulate movement of workers or regulate on the basis of
nationality, are prohibited. If a provision creates an obstacle, the effect of which
is to reduce free movement of workers, and access to employment, the provision is
presumptively not allowed.
Of course, some provisions may affect access to employment, but on
legitimate job-related grounds. A requirement that employees speak English will
affect access to employment, but there is generally a valid purpose behind such a
restriction. The court in Bosman expressly found the stated rationale for the
transfer system-to equalize quality of professional soccer teams-inadequate to
support the restriction. There were better means of achieving the same result
without obstructing free movement of workers. An obstruction may be
acceptable if the restriction has a valid and necessary connection to a legitimate
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goal, but there must be no alternative means of attaining the goal and the
restriction must actually have the effect it claims as its purpose.
The Homegrown Rule applies without regard to the nationality of the
workers concerned and does not expressly restrict movement of EU soccer
players among Member State leagues. The requirement that players develop in
the club team's country, however, will tend to result in fewer spots on club
teams for noncitizens. Given the attendant proposal of limiting club roster size
to twenty-five players, the Homegrown Rule will have the effect of decreasing
the total number of spaces available on teams.7 3 Because as many as eight of
these spots are more likely to go to domestic rather than foreign players,74
overall access of foreign players to employment on club teams will be reduced.
Where it is neither economically feasible nor allowed under the proposed rule
itself for teams to hire as many players as they want, the rule will have a
discriminatory effect and will impede the free movement of EU citizens among
Member States. The Rule cannot escape scrutiny under obstruction analysis by
claiming to further a legitimate, non-discriminatory goal. Supporters of the
Homegrown Rule claim improvement of the sport as their goal,7" but Bosman
rejected sporting interest as a valid basis for restriction whenever there are
alternative, nondiscriminatory methods of achieving the same result.76 Given the
level of uncertainty (among fans, commentators and professionals alike) as to
the necessity for, or likely success of, the Homegrown Rule in improving the
sport of soccer, the ECJ is unlikely to conclude that the Homegrown rule is the
sole well-constructed means of achieving this goal.
V. CONCLUSION
If challenged, the EC is likely to find the Homegrown Rule invalid under
antidiscrimination and freedom of movement laws. Nonetheless, they should at
least consider whether soccer deserves an exception based on its uniquely local
nature. With the Homegrown Rule, UEFA is making an effort to comply with
the letter of EU antidiscrimination law while still preserving the important local
character of European league soccer. It recognizes the validity of
antidiscrimination policy and imposes only minimal restrictions on free
movement, but reaffirms private league soccer as more than purely economic
activity. Soccer is not a business like any other business. It commands passionate
loyalty from its supporters; it plays heavily on patriotism and local identity; it
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elevates athletes to the level of national heroes; and while it generates huge
profits for players and club owners, neither of these groups are motivated by
money alone. Application of a standard aimed at normal economic activity to an
activity as distinct, powerful and localized as soccer is unnecessary and leads to
distortions at odds with the true character of the game. It is this distortion that
UEFA is currently trying to address.
Five teams (out of thirty-two) that competed in the most recent
Champions League would not meet the Homegrown Rule requirements if
enacted today.77 In proposing the Homegrown Rule, UEFA addresses a current
problem in professional soccer-a trend that may have worsening consequences
for the future. Additionally, UEFA reasserts its desire to resist the current trend
in EU law as applied to soccer. The Homegrown Rule is an attempt to evade
current law, and if the rule is challenged, the challenge may provide a key
opportunity for carving out a soccer exception to EU economic policy. Such an
exception would be appropriate given the unique nature of the business of
soccer. This is especially true where, as under the Homegrown Rule, the
exception would have only minor affects on free movement of workers. A
reexamination of application of antidiscrimination laws to soccer would be the
EC's best option in resolving the current conflict.
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